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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION: NEPA AT TWENTY
The title of this conference raises the initial question: "What
is a ripe old age for a statute?" You may have noticed people
wearing T-shirts these days with the inscription, "Fifty Isn't Old
for a Tree." Indeed, it isn't old compared to the bristlecone pine,
which boasts some individual members that germinated over 5000
years ago, about the time writing was being invented in the Mid-
dle East.1 Fifty isn't old even for a geoduck (a long-necked clam
residing in Puget Sound), since the average age of the entire pop-
ulation is close to forty. Fifty, however, is old for some species of
microbes and bacteria that "can divide every twenty minutes or
SO. 92
How old is old for a statute like the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)?5 If we were to present the life cycle of a stat-
ute on a graph, I suspect the measure of its influence would de-
cline over time, expressed as a downwards sloping curve.' Infor-
mation theory, like the physical entropy laws, suggests that the
statutory message will become garbled and faint as it is transmit-
ted over time.' The trick, of course, is to identify the correct de-
cay rate-or rate of rot-for a particular legislative product.
Some statutes and administrative measures decline at a rate
approximating that of fresh fish. Several of the Reagan Adminis-
tration's rollbacks of environmental rules were of this ilk, includ-
ing one act of tampering with the RCRA' hazardous waste land
ban that lived out its regulatory life in a mere twenty-five days.'
Other statutes and rules are more durable. The Statute of Uses'
1. See D. ATTENBOROUGH, LIFE ON EARTH: A NATURAL HISTORY 76 (1979).
2. L. MARGULIS & D. SAGAN, MICROCOSMOS: FOUR BILLION YEARS OF EVOLU-
TION FROM OUR MICROBIAL ANCESTORS 75 (1986).
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982).
4. For some of the problems with this type of supposition, see Rodgers, The
Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the
Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA. ST. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 384-88 (1989).
5. See J. CAMPBELL, GRAMMATICAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY, LANGUAGE
AND LIFE (1982).
6. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987). The land ban appears in § 3004(d). Id. § 6924(d).
7. See R. FORTUNA & D. LENNETT, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION-THE NEW
ERA: AN ANALYSIS AND GUIDE TO RCRA AND THE 1984 AMENDMENTS 12 (1987).
8. Statute of Uses of 1535, 27 Hen. 7, ch. 10.
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recently celebrated its 450th birthday. The Sherman ActO is push-
ing 100. Even the Insecticide Act of 1910,0 not one of the more
celebrated enactments of this century, lived to be thirty-seven
before it died of unnatural causes in a legislative accident called
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947.11
Being old or being young, of course, is usually an indicator of
other traits--health, vitality, influence. Even among statutes, we
are interested not so much in the length of life but with the qual-
ity of life. Many environmental lawyers celebrate the survival of
the Refuse Act of 1899,12 but those who have paid it a visit re-
cently regret to tell us that it slipped into an irreversible coma
some fifteen years ago.
II. NEPA AS A VIGOROUS TWENTY
We are gathered here to consider not so much a twenty year-
old law but a twenty year-old that has been extraordinarily far-
reaching and influential. In its own special way, NEPA and the
environmental assessment that it represents have become the le-
gal equivalent of cultural fads such as Hula Hoops, Rubik's
Cubes, and Air Jordans. A good portion of this conference, I sus-
pect, will be devoted to documenting the many measures of
NEPA's significance-the legal business it has generated, the in-
stitutional moves it has inspired, the precious places it is credited
with saving. My opening remarks will assume that NEPA is a sig-
nificant statutory presence and will explore the whys and where-
fores. Two concepts borrowed from natural history will be used as
the scaffolding-mimicry and recruitment.
A. Mimicry
Mimicry occurs in evolutionary biology when the members of
one species acquire traits and appearance that closely resemble
9. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
10. Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331, repealed by 61 Stat. 163, 172
(1947).
11. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C. §§
136-136y (1988). See 3 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES & ToXic
SUBSTANCES § 5.3, at 32-34 (1988).
12. Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988). See 2 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 4.11 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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those of another species.18 Mimicry can serve defensive purposes,
as with the butterflies that have evolved eye spots on their wings
that give pause to potential predators. Mimicry also can serve of-
fensive purposes, as with the hawks that have developed flying
patterns quite like those of a carrion eater that are not alarming
to potential prey. Mimicry often is resorted to in the life-and-
death gaming of nature because the copycat gains a tactical ad-
vantage by assuming the guise, traits, or behavior of the species
being mimicked. Necessarily, imitation is flattering to the model.
NEPA's environmental impact statement requirements are
widely mimicked throughout the law. Impact statements have
proliferated on issues of energy, inflation, economics, employ-
ment, discrimination, and a variety of other topics. This mimicry
has spread to the states, in the form of the many state environ-
mental policy acts (SEPAs), and to a large number of foreign na-
tions, which have considered NEPA worthy of emulation and ad-
aptation. What is it about NEPA's environmental impact
statement that has loosed the flood of imitation? What do the
mimics gain by advocating and acquiring an impact statement on
the subject held most dear? Three possibilities come to mind: (1)
early warnings, (2) a consideration of cumulative and second-level
effects, and (3) the introduction of authoritative and multiple pol-
icy voices.
1. Early Warnings
Yesterday's choices always have had a hold on tomorrow's
options, and there is a consequent advantage in being forewarned
when decisions of interest are headed your way. In the 1970s, the
early warning advantages of the impact statement were not lost
on Adrian Fisher, General Counsel of the U.S. Disarmament
Agency. He was interested in pursuing a legislative requirement
that Department of Defense appropriations requests for new
weapons systems include an analysis of the impact on ongoing
disarmament discussions." Fisher was fully aware, of course, that
disarmament negotiations hoping to influence the hardware only
could benefit from a forewarning of weapons in the pipeline.
13. See MIMICRY AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS (L.P. Brower ed. 1988); D.
OWEN, CAMOUFLAGE & MIMICRY: SURVIVAL IN THE WILD (1980).
14. This is based upon my recollection of personal conversations many years
ago with Adrian Fisher.
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Fisher had his way, and disarmament impact statements are still
required by law,15 although citizen enforcement suits are unavail-
able. Legislative and administrative copying tends to be imperfect
and partial, a picking and choosing of what seems to be useful.'
2. Cumulative and Second-Level Effects
Environmental advocates display a variety of strategies for
using NEPA to encourage agencies to consider the additive effects
of small decisions. The advantage of the comprehensive assess-
ment is not lost on observers and would-be mimics. A good illus-
tration comes from the pesticide laws,' which require economic
impact assessments to accompany certain regulatory decisions re-
stricting the use of chemical pesticides. This phenomenon con-
firms that the genius of NEPA is to address government decision
making in a grammar that has considerable potential for expan-
sion. The "victims" featured in the economic impact statement,
to be sure, are not the victims of pollution, but the victims of
efforts to combat it: the "environment" they seek to maintain is
not a back-to-nature agrarianism, but a normality built around
synthetic chemicals. But these losers do share one strong bond
with the classical losers of environmental pollution-a steady suf-
fering at the hands of incremental decisions that fail to consider
broader consequences.
3. Authoritative and Multiple Voices
NEPA's consultation and statement-circulation requirements
have brought to the surface differences of opinion among agencies
that would have been considered disorderly and inappropriate in
pre-NEPA times. The best illustration of this point, perhaps, is
the debate in the United States during the late 1960s over gov-
ernment support for the supersonic transport airplane (SST). The
Nixon administration came out in favor of the SST. Federal agen-
cies and leaders, including Council on Environmental Quality
15. See 22 U.S.C. § 2576 (1988); Min, Toward More Intelligent National Se-
curity Policy Making: The Case for Reform of Arms Control Impact Statements,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (1985).
16. See R. Settle, Washington's SEPA at-Eighteen: A "Little NEPA's" Fam-
ily Resemblance Fades (rev. ed. Oct. 27, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
17. See 3 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 11, § 5.18, at 242-43.
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(CEQ) Chairman Russell Train, closed .ranks in support of the
project, in a version of agency unanimity that was common in the
1950s.18 Twenty years later, after the experience of a generation
with NEPA, we would be surprised to see the major agencies of
the federal government address a controversial environmental is-
sue (for example, oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge) with a single voice. NEPA solicits varying opinions, and
compels their revelation, contributing to today's more chaotic po-
litical world.
The consultation requirements alone can erode the ability of
omnipotent agencies to work their will. Perhaps one reason for
the enthusiastic worldwide embrace of the environmental assess-
ment rules19 is that they can prove marginally beneficial in any
political setting in which there exists a smattering of organized
dissent to development decisions. Consider a country, X, with but
two government agencies-an all-powerful Ministry of War and a
substantially weaker Ministry of Interior Affairs. Certainly, the
NEPA consultation and discussion requirements would prove
helpful to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, since its opinion on
development decisions will now be heard by the Ministry of War.
This is hardly a sweeping political reform, to be sure, but agency
disagreement can lead to policy change.
NEPA works in the United States by drawing out different
voices on the subjects of the environmental consequences and ap-
propriate responses to them. This can bring about subtle changes
in institutional behavior. Michael Blumm and Steve Brown have
shown that an environmental group can expect to win a NEPA
case only if it finds allies within the ranks of organized govern-
ment. 0 It could be said that environmental opinions rise above
18. See Memorandum from Russell E. Train to James M. Beggs, Chairman,
SST Ad Hoc Review Committee (Mar. 21, 1969), reprinted in W. SHURCLIFF, S/S/
T AND SONWC Boom HANDBOOK 139-41 (1970). See generally Andreen, In Pursuit
of NEPA's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of
Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L. REV. 205 (1989) (thoughtful and constructive ar-
ticle focusing on § 309 of the Clean Air Act).
19. See N. Robinson, The Present and Future International Applications of
NEPA (rev. ed. Oct. 27, 1989) (unpublished manuscript). Compare Pollack,
Reimagining NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359
(1985) (urging that NEPA accommodate the "deep ecology" perspective as well as
the "technocratic" and "grassroots" views it now embraces).
20. See Blumm & Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of Com-
ment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 277 (1990).
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the threshold of the credible when they can recruit support from
within government circles.
The multiplication of views under NEPA also can attract ju-
dicial endorsement in circuitous fashion. The issue of judicial def-
erence to administrative agencies can be reformulated: the ques-
tion is not whether to defer, but to whom. The late Justice
William Douglas, for example, quickly grasped these prospects
within NEPA when he chose to credit the views of the environ-
mental opposition, as voiced by the CEQ, over the opinions of the
line agency defending the environmentally destructive policy
choice.2 ' Expansion of the spectrum of opinion makes deference a
more attractive option.
B. Recruitment
In biology, recruitment occurs when individuals of a species
are brought together for a common enterprise. In recruitment,
there is advantage in joining the behavior of others; in mimicry
there is advantage in copying it. For my purposes, both types of
activities serve as metaphors for the broad tendencies in the law
to borrow from NEPA, extend it, and use it.
A recent book on the behavior of ravens explores the predi-
lection of these birds to call loudly to their fellows to attract them
to food bonanzas (such as moose or deer carcasses) discovered in
the cold and snowy north woods. 22 Not all species behave with
such conspicuous generosity. The chickadee, for one, will fight to
defend a 1200 pound moose carcass as if he hoped to consume the
whole thing himself. The question arises why these ravens are
ready to call friends and acquaintances to the banquet even
though the food never lasts very long. The book offers a delightful
inquiry into the hypotheses that might explain this unusual be-
havior: the birds, perhaps, are pursuing a self-interested "taster"
strategy, using their friends to sample for poisons; or maybe a
"nutcracker" strategy, which depends upon attracting not other
birds but coyotes and their like that can break into the food
bank; or possibly a "support" strategy, in which territorial de-
21. See Rodgers, The Fox and the Chickens: Mr. Justice Douglas and Envi-
ronmental Law, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUS-
TICE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (S.L. Washy ed. forthcoming 1990).
22. B. HEINRICH, RAVENS IN WINTER (1989).
1990]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
fenders of the food will be overwhelmed if a mob of fifty or sixty
is recruited; or simply a reciprocal "sharing" strategy where all
are better off by passing around the caches of goodies discovered
by individual scouts.
The raven vignette shows that an identical pattern of behav-
ior might be sustained and nurtured by any number of separate
motivations, and presumably also by combinations of motiva-
tions. Recruitment can serve redundant functions. Similarly, a re-
markable feature of NEPA is its ability to attract and hold a
broad coalition of interests with widely disparate motivations and
tactics. NEPA helps the enemies and the friends of agencies, out-
siders and insiders, low level staffers and high level appointees,
other agencies, agency overseers, lobbyists, scholars, and journal-
ists. There are many reasons for flocking to NEPA.
Four features of the legislation, in particular, have contrib-
uted greatly to its success. Let me refer, in order, to (1) NEPA as
a sleeper, (2) its process orientation, (3) its elaboration through
CEQ rules, and (4) its robustness.
1. NEPA as Sleeper
The environmental laws are filled with historical accidents
and surprises28 in which the enactments of yesteryear acquire in-
fluence and achieve applications far beyond those contemplated
by the designers. There are theoretical reasons for suspecting the
appearance of these sleepers in legislation.24 One of them is that
it is easier for legislators to vote for the unknown than the known.
Sheer serendipity also plays a role, as it does in all human af-
fairs;2" indeed, would a NEPA enacted in 1960 or 1980 have fol-
lowed the same trajectory as the NEPA of 1970?
Much of the experience with NEPA contradicts the rational-
ity hypotheses of legislative design. It is as if the architects of
NEPA drafted a blueprint for a two-story building, which bal-
looned into a 100-story skyscraper before the builders were fin-
ished. Details that attracted close legislative attention either were
23. See Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in
the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. HEALTH LAW & POL'Y 161, 169-70 (1989).
24. See 3 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 11; Rodgers, supra note 4; Rodgers,
supra note 23.
25. See R. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY: ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERIES IN SCIENCE (1989).
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smothered or destroyed; the section 101(c) "right" to a healthful
environment is a good example.2 6 Other specifics were thoroughly
botched or confused, as with the Muskie/Jackson compromise
that sought to reconcile NEPA with the other environmental
laws." Ironically, the possibility not discussed, mentioned, or ad-
verted to in the legislative materials-the NEPA law-
suit-contained the seeds of the statute's explosive growth.
Other articles in this symposium will trace the extraordinary
developments in the NEPA case law. Allow me to underscore the
rapidity with which the NEPA lawsuit became routine-100 deci-
sions in the lower federal courts before the Supreme Court could
get a word in edgewise; 28 500 before the Court wrote anything in-
telligible on the subject.29 This flood of lawsuits represents an ex-
pression of NEPA's broad recruitment powers, offering hope not
only for environmentalists against agencies, but also for develop-
ers against agencies, 0 and for agencies against agencies.3 "
2. NEPA as Process-Monger
This topic can be broached by a reference to currency, which
is a notion widely used in ethology (the study of animal behavior)
and applied in human decision and negotiations theory. 2 Cur-
26. See W. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 701 (1977) (dis-
cussing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1982)).
27. See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 243 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert
eds. 1974).
28. Based upon a computer search of NEPA decisions predating United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)
(SCRAP 1).
29. Based upon a computer search of NEPA decisions predating Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
30. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971),
aff'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974).
31. See, e.g., Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Postal
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Montgomery v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp.
591 (W.D. Va. 1972). On the important intra-agency effects of NEPA, see Acker-
man, Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The Effects of
the National Environmental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making,
20 ENVTL. L. *** (1990); Schmidt, NEPA from Inside the Bonneville Power Ad-
ministration, (presentation at NEPA at Twenty: The Past, Present and Future of
the National Environmental Policy Act, Oct. 27-28, 1989).
32. See F. DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 82-83 (1989).
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rency is anything of value that can be used to pay off obligations.
A chimp understands currency, as do most zookeepers; a banana,
duly offered, will convince most chimps to retrieve a broom left at
the far end of the enclosure.33
Legislators, too, can make their trades with different curren-
cies, of which procedural entitlements are most common. Perhaps
twenty-five percent of the written words of the major environ-
mental laws are devoted exclusively to the process- 4-the studies,
findings, hearings, statements of reasons, and impact statements
so familiar to contemporary students of the subject. Legislators
often treat process as the first free good-something they can cre-
ate more and more of without creating less of anything else. Like
the stone discs used for money on the Pacific Island of Yap, pro-
cess rights can be described as "hard to make, difficult to counter-
feit, not easily lost, stolen, or destroyed."3 "
NEPA is the ultimate instrument of the use of process as
currency. It is strongly driven by a win-win sentiment: the agen-
cies can have their projects, and the losers get their full disclos-
ure, consultation, and reasoned decision making. One party, A, is
afforded an opportunity to be heard, another, B, gets a mandated
study, and a third, C, is given a generous list of particularized
findings.
NEPA's process orientation enhances its recruitment pros-
pects. As the courts are well aware, process can speak a hundred
languages. Process makes it possible to say "no" without saying
"no." The project thus can be unacceptable not because of its
abominable environmental effects, but because alternatives were
inadequately considered, or inadequately discussed if they were
considered, or inadequately researched if they were discussed.
Even an enthusiastic project sponsor eventually might under-
stand this message.
There is, of course, a down side to this process frenzy. Pro-
cess, without more, is fundamentally a toothless exercise, commit-
ted only to the perfection of forms. No amount of process, other
than by leaps of faith, can make the environment demonstrably
cleaner, healthier, or more diverse. And players in process games
33. See id. at 82.
34. These are my own estimates.
35. J. READER, MAN ON EARTH 26 (1988).
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can drift to the cynical, as each loss presages the next temporary
win, and each win gives way to the next provisional loss.
3. The CEQ Regulations as Frozen Law
Another reason for the success of NEPA and for recruitment
to its design is the conspicuous and unusual elaboration of its re-
quirements in the rules promulgated by the CEQ 6 If NEPA it-
self is a contradiction of rationality theories, the CEQ regulations
are a confirmation of them. The NEPA rules have been praised
for all the usual reasons-meticulous definition, careful drafts-
manship, workability, and sensitivity to context. They were writ-
ten by knowledgeable and energetic attorneys who did their
homework. They were developed through an elaborate, open, and
deliberative process, which makes them something of a prototype
of the negotiated rule before the possibilities become widely
acknowledged.
The durability of the CEQ rules deserves particular mention.
In the terminology of my introduction, the decay rate for the
CEQ rules has been strikingly slow." They have remained virtu-
ally intact throughout the second ten years of NEPA's twenty,
and have served as the blueprint for contemporary users of
NEPA not to mention the spinoff SEPAs and other versions of
environmental assessment. The only formal change, initiated with
great strain, produced infinitesimal modifications in the "worst
case" analysis, which is now perhaps better known as a scientific
uncertainty analysis."
Why have the CEQ rules endured through a decade of politi-
cal change? A partial answer is that things well done have a
longer staying power than the trite and superficial. But there is
some irony at work as well. During the Reagan years, the CEQ
was not the agency it once was, given staff cutbacks, desertions,
and a general lowering of expectations. There were few lawyers
36. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1988). Compare Yost, Streamlining NEPA--An
Environmental Success Story, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 507 (1981) with Stewart,
Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative To Traditional Rulemak-
ing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1981). See also D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGA-
TION: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT ch. 7 (1984).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
38. See 3 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 11, at § 5.5 (NEPA in the context of
pesticides).
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around to rewrite the rules even if there was a constituency for
doing so. This adds a new variant to the adage, "kill all the law-
yers first"-"don't kill them until they undo what gives you cause
to kill them."
4. NEPA's Robustness
NEPA and its progeny tend to be robust laws in the sense
that they can survive in variegated bureaucratic, legal, and cul-
tural environments. Some of the reasons for this wide popularity
are canvassed above. 9 Additionally, NEPA is easily reconciled
with other laws. Litigators long have been aware of the ease with
which NEPA is used in tandem with other environmental laws,
such as the Endangered Species Act"0 or the Marine Mammal
Protection Act; 1 NEPA specifies the process, the other statutes
the substance that binds agency decision makers.
Thus, NEPA is easily ratcheted upwards when the impact
statement appears in the context of parallel substantive laws.
And NEPA is easily ratcheted downwards. Congress often writes
project-specific exceptions to delicate undertakings by declaring-
that they are not "major federal actions.""' Environmentalists
rarely applaud these piecemeal legislative repeals of NEPA. But a
point can be made in favor of piecemeal repeals-they are prefer-
able to wholesale repeals. The robustness of NEPA is confirmed
by the fact that politically popular projects can escape from the
EIS requirements without putting the entire Act in jeopardy.
III. OBSTACLES TO NEPA INFLUENCE: THE DIRTY DOZEN
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Thus far these introductory remarks have proceeded as if the
39. See supra text accompanying notes 8-33. See also Kent & Pendergrass,
Has NEPA Become a Dead Issue? Preliminary Results of a Comprehensive Study
of NEPA Litigation, 5 TEmp. LAW & TECHNICAL J. 11, 16 (1986) ("while successful
NEPA challenges have declined as NEPA has aged, NEPA still shows signs of
vitality").
40. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
41. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). See W.
RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.12 (1977) (citing many other
examples).
42. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 36, § 5.07; Orsi, Emergency Exceptions to
NEPA: Who Should Decide?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 481 (1987).
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survival, elaboration, and emulation of NEPA were sustained by
an irresistible accumulation of social and legal forces. We know
that is not the case. NEPA has survived more than a few political
and legal obstacles. The most impressive of these is an unbroken
string of twelve Supreme Court decisions consistently rejecting
interpretations advanced by environmental groups and accepting
the narrower accounts espoused by the government as the NEPA
defendant.43 In few walks of legal life has the Court demonstrated
such a decided tilt in its choice of prevailing parties. The Court's
pronounced anti-environmentalism has not gone unnoticed."4 My
hypothesis is that NEPA has survived this twelve-part demolition
job in surprisingly good condition,' 6 which raises questions about
the Court's motivations and methods as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Motivations are not easily discovered, but one
must admit that the twelve decisions can be read benignly as evi-
dence that the Court works carefully at the margins, pruning
away the extravagant excesses of NEPA interpretations.' My
comments on methods and circumstances will address the Court's
(1) timing, (2) choice of nonreplicable cases, (3) ideological and
43. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989); Rob-
ertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989); Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983); Metro-
politan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); Wein-
berger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981); Strycker's Bay Neighbor-
hood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (consolidat-
ing two cases); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I/), 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
44. Compare 1 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 3.5
(1986 & Supp. 1988) and 2 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 12, at § 4.6 with Levy &
Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environ-
mental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1989) and Goldsmith & Banks, En-
vironmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1983) and J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DECISIONMAKING AND NEPA 114 (1986) and Murchison, Does NEPA Mat-
ter?-An Analysis of the Historical Development and the Contemporary Signifi-
cance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1984).
45. The most damaging decision of the 12 is Robertson v. Methow Valley Cit-
izens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989), which put the nail in the coffin of substan-
tive NEPA. Legislation might be necessary to repair the damage. See infra note
80.
46. See Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Ex-
planations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990).
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selective interventions, and (4) mistakes and contrivances. I also
will discuss the inescapable indeterminacy of NEPA legal
doctrine.
A. Poor Timing
As mentioned above,"' the flood of NEPA litigation assumed
a strong presence in the lower federal courts before the Supreme
Court had occasion to review the statute. It is as if the flow of
environmental history commandeered the legal ground before the
Court was prepared to defend it or define it. The Court's initial
choice of vehicles for addressing the meaning of NEPA, the so-
called SCRAP litigation,48 could not have been worse. The facts
are excruciatingly complicated, the opinions unrestrainedly bor-
ing, and the outcomes are of little interest. To this day, what ex-
perts in the field can restate the holdings of SCRAP I or SCRAP
II?
The timing of the Court's entry into the subject, of NEPA is
poor in the sense that it minimized the influence of what the
Court had to say. The staying of the hand, however, was astute to
the extent it allowed the subject to be defined by the accumula-
tion of precedents in the lower federal courts.
B. Nonreplicable Circumstances: Cans, Bombs, and Accidents
Another circumstance that has diminished the Court's influ-
ence is its choice of nonreplicable cases for review. The leading
NEPA cases address not the dredge and fill projects, highway and
sewage treatment plant construction, but rather throwaway cans
and bottles,"9 the siting of nuclear weapons, 50 and behavior in the
wake of a nuclear power plant accident.5 1 These cases are utterly
unrepresentative of the normal range of environmental issues liti-
gated in federal courts.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
48. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973) (SCRAP 1), aff'd, Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. Co. v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (SCRAP II).
49. Id.
50. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
51. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766
(1983).
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Why did the Court choose such exotic fare? Surely the Jus-
tices and their law clerks do not lunge for the bizarre case in the
same way a cat might seize an attractive objective dangled
nearby. Yet, cans, bombs, and accidents have an intrinsic interest
likely to exceed that reserved, for example, for the extension of a
sewer line. A charitable construction of the Court's NEPA agenda
is that hard cases make bad law, and thus correctable excesses
will be found at the far margins in the outrider circumstances.
Still, the Court's review choices have diminished its influence in
this area.
C. Ideological and Selective Interventions
Another factor limiting the Supreme Court's influence is that
the Court's NEPA agenda is controlled closely by the Justice De-
partment and its Office of Solicitor General.2 Decisions to seek
review appear to rest on criteria no more elaborate than the dis-
covery of provocative and disagreeable language in appellate
court opinions. This hunt-and-peck tactic of opinion-prowling fo-
cuses the Court's attention on small issues, subissues, or nonis-
sues having the single common theme of being ideologically offen-
sive. The Ninth Circuit has started many of these brush fires,
prompting the Supreme Court to respond negatively on the sub-
jects of worst-case analysis,53 hypothetical EISs,5 ' and fully devel-
oped mitigation plans."
That the Court is the willing principal as well as the unfortu-
nate agent of these selective and ideological review strategies is
illustrated by the decision in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambell5 The case holds that the native subsistence fishing
rights recognized by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser-
vation Act do not extend to the outer continental shelf that is the
site of federal oil and gas leasing activities." But the importance
of the decision is not its holding, but its dictum that insists that
the mere violation of environmental statutes (such as NEPA)
does not necessarily entitle the complaining party to injunctive
52. See Shilton, supra note 46.
53. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989).
54. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 139.
55. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
56. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
57. Id. at 546.
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relief.*5s Indeed, the opinion for the Court is an oddly con-
structed configuration-first, no remedy, then, by the way, no
right. It is the kind of advisory opinion the general counsel of an
administrative agency might give to inquiring staffers.
D. Contrivances and Mistakes
Two other features of the Supreme Court's NEPA methodol-
ogy have contributed to the Court's achievement of the least pos-
sible precedential mileage from a dozen major deci-
sions-contrivances and mistakes. The contrivance strategy, is
illustrated by the deliberate planting of dicta to hasten the de-
mise of substantive NEPA. At the end of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Vermont Yankee appears this lonely observation:
"NEPA, while establishing significant substantive goals for the
Nation, imposes upon agencies duties that are essentially proce-
dural.""8 Kept alive in Strycker's Bay,60 the dictum reappears as
the holding in last term's Robertson decision: "it is now well set-
tled that NEPA itself does not impose substantive duties man-
dating particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary pro-
cess."61 The issue was so "well settled" by this scant precedent, in
fact, that the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the language
of section 101,62 which is NEPA's substantive provision. Indeed, it
was so "well settled" that the Court in Robertson confidently
could embrace its nefarious kill-all-the-deer dictum:
In this case .... it would not have violated NEPA if the Forest
Service, after complying with the Act's procedural prerequisites,
had decided that the benefits to be derived from downhill skiing at
Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a special use permit, notwith-
standing the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent of
58. Id. at 542-43.
59. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
60. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (per curiam).
61. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach
to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARv. L. REV. 735 (1975). See also Plater
& Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbi-
trary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental
Decisions 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661 (1989).
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the mule deer herd."
Some observers find it difficult to understand how the na-
tion's principal environmental law-the one whose birthday we
are celebrating-is strictly indifferent to whether 30,000 deer in
the Methow Valley live or die. Many others would ask how the
issue could be "settled" beyond further discussion by a few stray
phrases conveniently placed in earlier Supreme Court decisions.
We may learn yet that the deer still can be saved, not by NEPA,
but by the Administrative Procedure Act." But a clear twelve-
decision trend suggests otherwise.
Why do I count this obliteration of substantive NEPA as a
debit rather than a credit in this assessment of the Court's influ-
ence? My answer; elaborated below, is that enduring judicial in-
fluence must rest on a foundation more secure than ukase and
contrivance.
Turning to the methodology of mistake, it should be noted
that reputation follows performance in all walks of life, including
the art of judging. On the general subject of environmental law,
the Court's performance leaves much to be desired, 5 even in such
basic skills as statute-reading and rendering accurate historical
accounts. A similar clumsiness carries over to its treatment of
NEPA. For example, the leading Kleppe decision 6 asserts that
NEPA "does not require an agency to consider the possible envi-
ronmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the
impact statement on proposed actions."6 " This statement shows a
lamentable ignorance of context. It fundamentally confuses the
issue of statement timing, which is tied to the "proposal" lan-
guage in section 102(2)(C), 68 with that of statement scope, which
is controlled by the particulars of subsections 102(2)(C)(i)-(v). 69
Not surprisingly, the obligation to assess "effects" and "any irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources" in the EIS
might oblige an agency to consider possible impacts of less immi-
63. 109 S. Ct. at 1846 (these percentages consist of 30,000 animals in the
Methow Valley).
64. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228 n.2.
65. See supra note 46.
66. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
67. Id. at 410 n.20.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
69. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v).
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nent actions when preparing a statement on a proposed action.
Surely the Court does not believe an agency is excused from dis-
cussing any possible effects the agency does not propose to bring
about. This is a small dereliction, perhaps, in a large context, but
reputations are built on an accumulation of small endeavors. The
Supreme Court's reputation on NEPA is secure.
E. Flaccidity of Principle
A fifth reason NEPA has overcome its lack of sponsorship by
the Supreme Court stems more from the nature of the judicial
process than it does from the particulars of the court rulings. The
NEPA rules, like much judicial doctrine, tend to be flaccid, inde-
terminate, and highly susceptible to interpretation by the rule-
applier. A dozen decisions, one way or the other, are swamped in
this sea of indeterminacy. Thus, under Vermont Yankee the envi-
ronmental impact statement need only discuss alternatives that
are reasonable,70 which leaves room for differences of opinion.
Baltimore Gas & Electric counsels the courts to give a soft glance
to agency choices on the "frontiers of science, ' 7 ' but Kleppe in-
sists upon a hard look at other types of decisions. 72 This differ-
ence between hard and soft is one of the great mysteries of con-
temporary administrative law. Flint Ridge and Catholic Action
assert that NEPA must retreat if another statute bars the way.7
But to the extent there is compatibility, there must be full NEPA
compliance and somebody has to make the call. Village of
Gambell makes clear that a NEPA violation will not always be
corrected by injunction.7 But the decision also confirms that en-
vironmental injury is seldom remedied by money damages. 75 The
question of injunction or not is thus left to the future.
Another obvious proposition is that the Supreme Court must
convince its constituencies rather than coerce them. Continued
70. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 724-26 (1979).
71. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983).
72. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
73. Compare Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976)
with Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
74. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
75. See id. at 545.
[Vol. 20:485
MIMICRY AND RECRUITMENT
disobedience, especially in the lower federal courts, suggests that
the words being preached are not being credited. An anecdotal
account of what can happen to Supreme Court utterances is of-
fered by looking at the lower court decisions citing Catholic Ac-
tion. For what legal proposition does the decision stand? That an
agency need not disclose its NEPA thinking if the agency is con-
strained by another statute. For what is the decision commonly
cited? That agencies are obliged to inform the public that they
have considered environmental concerns.76 Whatever it may
mean, the practice of citing a precedent for the opposite of what
it held does not dignify the precedent.
IV. CONCLUSION
What does the future hold? What is NEPA's rate of rot or
decline? How will the statute be perceived at age forty or fifty?
Two scenarios come to mind. One is a kind of slow death not
unlike that attending the Refuse Act. Other and better-aimed
statutes would appear on the flanks. NEPA would be consigned
strictly to process matters, and process alone is a prospect busy
staffers may be inclined to resist after a fifteen-year diet on the
subject. Whether this scenario is in the wings or already under-
way turns upon empirical questions that may be addressed at this
conference: Do staff level people within the agencies have a stake
in the environmental assessment process as it appears in NEPA
and the SEPAs, and do they believe it to be workable and worthy
of retention?
A second scenario would be a slow march by NEPA toward
substantive consequence. Prior to the Robertson decision, 7 a
coming together of a number of considerations suggested that the
impact statements would evolve into a roster of enforceable envi-
ronmental obligations. The scientific community took an interest
in the use of EISs as hypotheses; 76 the documents, after all, are
76. E.g., Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1984); Morris
County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1983);
Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 603 F. Supp. 518, 526 (W.D. La. 1984).
77. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
78. COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL THEORY TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROBLEMS, COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECOLOGI-
CAL KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM-SOLVING: CONCEPTS AND CASE
STUDIES (1986).
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filled with predictions about how a particular project will affect
the environment, so a methodology naturally suggests itself-go
back and consider how accurate the predictions were. Lawyers,
too, had begun to take steps to compare outcomes with predic-
tions and to develop strategies for penalizing wrong guesses and
holding agencies to promises and mitigation commitments devel-
oped in the course of the EIS process. 7 ' My own suspicion is that
the multiple pressures to make the EISs matter will overcome the
Robertson decision.
8 0
Let me close by taking one last run at this question of the
age of statutes. How old is NEPA? Twenty, going on forty. Old
enough to have became a legend in its time. Old enough for its
words to have become symbols, and its terms cultural artifacts.
This statute eventually will die-they all do-but legions will
work to extend its life, prolong its memory, and relive its exam-
ple. An extraordinary accomplishment for a twenty year-old.
79. See McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20
ENVTL. L. 569 (1990). Compare Eglick & Hiller, The Myth of Mitigation Under
NEPA and SEPA, 20 ENVn. L. 773 (1990).
80. See S. REP. No. 52, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. REP. No. 219, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an "Old" Law with Solu-
tions to New Problems, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,060 (1989).
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